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Abstract—The introduction of automated driving systems 
raised questions about how the human driver interacts with the 
automated system. Non-cooperative game theory is increasingly 
used for modelling and understanding such interaction, while its 
counterpart, cooperative game theory is rarely discussed for 
similar applications despite it may be potentially more suitable. 
This paper describes the modelling of a human driver’s steering 
interaction with an automated steering system using cooperative 
game theory. The distributed Model Predictive Control approach 
is adopted to derive the driver’s and the automated steering 
system’s strategies in a Pareto equilibrium sense, namely their 
cooperative Pareto steering strategies. Two separate numerical 
studies are carried out to study the influence of strategy 
parameters, and the influence of strategy types on the driver’s and 
the automated system’s steering performance. It is found that 
when a driver interacts with an automated steering system using a 
cooperative Pareto steering strategy, the driver can improve 
his/her performance in following a target path through increasing 
his/her effort in pursuing his/her own interest under the 
driver-automation cooperative control goal. It is also found that a 
driver’s adoption of cooperative Pareto steering strategy leads to 
a reinforcement in the driver’s steering angle control, compared 
to the driver’s adoption of non-cooperative Nash strategy. This in 
turn enables the vehicle to return from a lane-change maneuver to 
straight-line driving swifter. 
 
Index Terms—Driver, automated driving system, modelling, 
cooperative game theory. 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE past decade has seen many advances in automated 
driving technology. Sophisticated systems capable of 
performing various aspects of driving tasks independently of 
human drivers have been developed [1]. Such automated 
driving systems are believed to possess great potential to reduce 
traffic accidents and improve social productivity [2]. However, 
from the point of views of liability and safety, human drivers 
are expected to retain their control of vehicle during driving [3]. 
Consequently, there can be situations where the human driver 
and the automated driving system apply control actions to a 
vehicle simultaneously. Consider that a human driver is driving 
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a vehicle equipped with an automated steering system that can 
apply steering actions independently of the driver, such as the 
Active Front Steering (AFS) system described in [4] which 
features superimposing a steering angle upon the driver’s 
steering wheel angle through a planetary gear apparatus. Now 
assume that a pedestrian suddenly runs into the road in front of 
the vehicle. On detecting the pedestrian, the automated steering 
system may decide to steer around the pedestrian based on 
some prescribed hazard evaluation logic, e.g. the one proposed 
in [5]. However, the driver may decide to decelerate the vehicle 
and meanwhile keep the vehicle travelling straight ahead since 
the driver may think the pedestrian will run across the road very 
quickly. As a result, the objective of the driver and that of the 
automated steering system diverge. This may cause the driver 
and the automated steering system to compete via steering. For 
example, the automated steering system steers the vehicle 
leftwards to avoid the pedestrian while the driver steers in the 
opposite direction to keep the vehicle travelling straight ahead. 
A possible consequence is that the vehicle eventually follows a 
path neither desirable to the automated steering system nor to 
the human driver. In the worst case, this may lead to a collision 
with the pedestrian. The situation described above suggests the 
significance of understanding the interaction between human 
drivers and vehicle automated driving systems and predicting 
the impacts of the interaction on vehicle directional responses. 
Research on the interaction between human drivers and 
automated driving systems currently relies heavily on 
experimental approaches which are time-consuming and 
expensive. A further issue may arise from automotive 
manufacturers’ continuing efforts into the development of new 
automated driving technology. A new development may 
expand the dimensions of present problems so that existing 
experimental-based solutions and knowledge become less 
effectual. An alternative approach is to establish a mechanistic 
model of human driver’s interaction with automated driving 
systems. Such a mechanistic model offers the capability of 
predicting and interpreting human driver’s reaction to 
automation intervention so that systematic optimization of 
present or future automated driving technology, e.g., sharing 
control [6], platooning [7], and parallel driving [8], becomes a 
possibility. 
Dynamic game theory provides a mechanistic basis for 
understanding the driver-automation interaction. From a 
dynamic game perspective, the human driver and the automated 
driving system are game players who make decisions 
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independently and act with each other in a repeated manner. As 
a result, each one’s action will influence the other’s well-being. 
In the situation described above, the human driver’s and the 
automated driving system’s well-beings can be defined as their 
individual path-following interest. A dynamic game can be 
either non-cooperative or cooperative, depending on how game 
players take into account each other’s interest [9]. In a 
non-cooperative game, each player focuses on pursuing their 
own interest without caring about other players’ interest. In 
contrast, players in a cooperative game tend to have a sense of 
collective responsibility and attempt to reach a binding 
agreement of interests [10].  
In recent years, there are increasing published reports of 
non-cooperative game theory applied in driver-vehicle 
dynamics. Ma and Peng [11] developed a non-cooperative 
game framework to evaluate the worst-case performance of a 
car under simultaneous control a driver and a vehicle stability 
controller. Tamaddoni et al. [12] used a non-cooperative game 
framework to develop a vehicle stability controller that 
accounts for driver’s steering input to reduce vehicle lateral and 
yaw motions in lane change maneuvers. Dextreit and 
Kolmanovsky [13] reported an algorithm for energy 
management of hybrid vehicles using non-cooperative game 
theory to compensate drivers’ inattention to eco-driving. Flad et 
al. [14] developed a steering assistance system where the 
driver’s steering wheel torque was predicted based on the 
solution to a non-cooperative game between the driver and the 
steering controller. Na and Cole [15] proposed a 
non-cooperative game-theoretic scheme for representing a 
driver’s steering behavior in response to an active steering 
controller in a collision avoidance scenario. Most recently, Ji et 
al. developed a non-cooperative game framework for 
implementing shared control between a driver and an angle 
angle-overlay steering system [16], and with a torque-overlay 
steering system [17], where the influence of different driver 
steering strategies were considered.  
In comparison to the ever-growing non-cooperative-game- 
oriented applications in driver-vehicle dynamics, little 
treatment has yet been given to its cooperative game 
counterpart. One instance of the limited work is by the authors 
[18] who outlined a scheme potentially viable in representing a 
human driver’s interaction with vehicle automated steering 
using cooperative game theory. The present paper expands the 
research described in [18] by incorporating a detailed 
formulation of the mathematical derivation of the driver’s and 
the automated steering system’s control strategies in a Pareto 
equilibrium sense, followed by two separate numerical studies 
on the influence of parameters and strategy types on the 
driver’s and the automated system’s control behavior. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
II recaps the scheme used for discussing the cooperative-game 
interaction between a human driver and a vehicle automated 
driving system. Section III formulates the analytical derivation 
of the driver’s and the automated steering system’s cooperative 
Pareto steering strategies. A numerical study is then carried out 
to examine the influence of key parameters in the strategies on 
the controllers’ steering behavior and vehicle response. Section 
IV describes a case study that examines the difference between 
a driver’s adoption of a cooperative Pareto steering strategy and 
his/her adoption of a non-cooperative Nash strategy. Section VI 
draws conclusions and suggests future work. 
 
II. SCHEME FOR COOPERATIVE-GAME INTERACTION BETWEEN 
HUMAN DRIVER AND AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEM 
Fig. 1 shows the scheme for cooperative-game interaction 
between a human driver and a vehicle automated driving 
system. The scheme describes how a “human driver” may 
interact with an “automated driving system” in a circumstance 
that each acts by coordinating its own interest with the other’s 
interest. The “automated driving system” exhibited in Fig. 1 
can be an automated steering system for collision avoidance, 
e.g. [5], or an active accelerator pedal for eco-driving, e.g. [19], 
etc.  
Under this scheme, the automated driving system determines 
its control action  at time step k by taking into account its 
own interest  as well as the driver’s control action  
and the driver’s interest . When an automated steering 
system is concerned,  is the steering angle applied by the 
system at time step k, and  is the steering angle generated 
by the driver.  and  are target road paths planned 
by the automated steering system and the driver at time step k, 
respectively. Hence, the automated system’s control strategy 
can be conceptually expressed as: 
                                      (1) 
Here  denotes the rule that maps , ,  
and  to the automated system’s control action . 
 represents vehicle state vector consisting of motion states 
such as lateral velocity  and yaw rate . More details 
on  will be provided in the next section.  can be 
measured or estimated in most modern vehicles [20]. Driver’s 
control action  can be measured using low-cost sensors. 
Driver’s target  can be identified by using appropriate 
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Fig. 1.    Scheme for cooperative-game interaction between human driver and 
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3 
driver intention detection algorithms [21].  
In practice it is possible that a human driver is able to identify 
some characteristics of the automated system. Specifically, the 
automated steering system’s target path  may be 
imparted to the driver via some onboard display, as discussed in 
[3]. Its control action  may be communicated to the driver 
either through a display in a similar way, or through haptic 
feedback. Consequently, the driver may be able to derive 
his/her own control strategy by accounting for  and 
, as depicted in Fig. 1. Hence, the human driver’s control 
strategy can be conceptually expressed as: 
                                       (2) 
where  denotes the mapping rule. 
 
III. DERIVATION OF CONTROL STRATEGIES IN COOPERATIVE- 
GAME INTERACTION 
In this section, analytical derivation of the driver’s and the 
automated driving system’s control strategies (1) and (2) will 
be discussed in the context of a human driver interacting with 
an automated steering system. A numerical analysis will then 
be carried out to investigate the influence of significant control 
strategy parameters on the driver’s and the automated system’s 
steering actions and the resultant vehicle motions. 
A. Driver-Vehicle Dynamics Model 
The automated steering system concerned in this paper 
involves a mechanism that allows steering angles to be applied 
to the vehicle independent of driver steering wheel action. Such 
a mechanism can be implemented through the Active Front 
Steering (AFS) system described in [4]. In such a system, the  
steering angle of vehicle front wheels is the summation of the 
angle applied by the driver  and the angle exerted by the 
AFS actuator . Hence, the dynamic evolution of vehicle 
state  can be described using the following state-space 
expression:  
                                        (3) 
The vehicle state vector  at time step k comprises vehicle 
lateral velocity , yaw rate , lateral displacement 
, lateral displacement integral , and yaw angle 
, i.e. . It can 
be seen from (3) that the evolution of  is driven by the 
driver’s steering angle  and the vehicle’s steering angle 
.  is the state matrix,  and  are input vectors 
associated with  and , respectively. For the sake of 
simplicity, the dynamics of the vehicle in this paper are 
represented using a linear time-invariant single-track model 
[18]. Therefore, ,  and  are time-invariant.  is the 
output vector which is set to . It 
represents the vehicle’s position and orientation.  is the output 
matrix that converts  to . 
B. Pareto Strategies 
In a theoretic game, an equilibrium represents a situation 
where no player is willing to change their strategy unilaterally 
since they will not gain any more by doing so [9]. In the context 
of a cooperative game, such an equilibrium is called a “Pareto 
equilibrium”. Its counterpart in a non-cooperative game is the 
famous “Nash equilibrium” [22]. The strategy of a player at a 
Pareto equilibrium is therefore called his/her cooperative 
Pareto strategy. 
On modelling of human drivers’ steering behavior, the 
Model Predictive Control (MPC) method is a natural choice 
since it is consistent with the “internal model” hypothesis 
widely adopted in neuroscience [23]. The suitability of using 
MPC for modelling human drivers’ steering behavior was 
demonstrated in several separated research, for example [24] 
and [25]. In both studies, the authors developed MPC-based 
driver steering control models and compared the optimal 
steering strategies derived from the driver models to measured 
human driver steering angles. It was found in both studies that 
the optimal steering strategies could represent the steering 
behavior of a variety of human drivers with different driving 
skills and experience. When the problem involves a human 
driver and an automated steering system who make decisions 
independently and apply steering actions simultaneously, 
distributed MPC, an extension of MPC to multi-agent 
applications becomes a possible option. The theoretical link 
between distributed MPC and dynamic games was established 
by Rawlings and Mayne [26], where the construction of game 
players’ optimization problems in both non-cooperative and 
cooperative cases were described. 
In this paper, the distributed MPC approach is adopted for 
deriving the analytical expressions of the driver’s and the 
automated system’s steering strategies in a Pareto equilibrium 
sense. This generally involves three steps: 1) construction of 
the human driver’s and the automated steering system’s cost 
functions, 2) establishment of their prediction equations, and 3) 
derivation of their cooperative Pareto steering strategies by 
optimizing their cost functions subject to their prediction 
equations. 
1) Construction of Cost Functions 
Regarding the interaction between a human driver and an 
automated steering system, the driver and the automated system 
have individual target road paths  and , as 
described in Fig. 1.  can be expressed as a sequence of 
vectors from the driver’s target vehicle orientation at k + 1 step, 
i.e.  up to the driver’s target vehicle orientation at k + 
N1 step, i.e. , where N1 is called the driver’s preview 
horizon: 
 










1 1 2 2( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
k k k k
k k
d d+ = + +
=




( )y k int ( )y k
( )ky { }Tint( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k v k k y k y k kw y=x
( )kx
1( )kd
2 ( )kd A 1B 2B
1( )kd 2 ( )kd
A 1B 2B ( )kz
{ }Tint( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k y k y k ky=z
C
( )kx ( )kz
1( )kR 2 ( )kR
1( )kR
1( 1)k +r





















> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
4 
human driver can look ahead. Each  where j = 1, 2, …, 
N1 consists of three elements: target lateral displacement 
, target lateral displacement integral , and 
target yaw angle , that is: 
, for j = 1, 2, …, N1 
The driver’s key interest at each time step k can be described as 
to minimize his/her road path tracking error , where 
. The term  represents the future 
path that the driver predicts at time step k up to his/her preview 
horizon N1.  holds the following format: 
 
Derivation of  follows an iterative approach towards the 
driver-vehicle dynamics equation (3) for N1 steps ahead. This 
approach will be described in detail later. Readers are 
suggested to bear in mind at the moment that  is 
independent of the driver’s target road path  but is 
influenced by the driver’s steering actions in the future up to the 
driver’s preview horizon N1.  contains essentially the 
difference between the driver’s target vehicle orientations and 
his/her predicted vehicle orientations at each future step, up to 
the driver’s preview horizon N1. 
Similarly, the automated steering system’s target path 
 comprises its own target vehicle orientations up to its 
preview horizon N2. The automated system’s key interest at 
time step k is to minimize its path tracking error 
, where  is the path predicted by 
the automated steering system up to its preview horizon N2. 
Since in a cooperative game, each game player tends to take 
care of all the other players’ interests, the cost function that the 
driver minimizes during his/her cooperative interaction with 
the automated steering system can be constructed as: 
                       (4) 
In (4)  is a vector of driver’s control actions from current 
steering angle  up to the future angle , that is 
. 
(4) implies that the driver aims at minimizing both the driver’s 
own tracking error  and the automated steering system’s 
tracking error .  is a diagonal matrix that weights 
.  can be expressed as: 
, where . 
,  and  are time-invariant weights that weigh 
respectively the lateral displacement error, lateral displacement 
error integral and yaw angle error involved in .  
weights  in an identical way.  can be expressed as: 
, where . 
 and  may differ from each other as the driver and the 
automated steering system may have different opinions in how 
strongly the tracking errors shall be weighted.  and  are 
parameters used to specify the relative weights between  
and . The driver’s cost function (4) can be then 
simplified as: 
                (5) 
where 
 and . 
Similarly, the cost function that the automated steering 
system attempts to minimize can be constructed as: 
                (6) 
It can be seen from (5) and (6) that both the driver and the 
automated steering system aim at minimizing  and 
 collectively. However, their steering angles may differ 
due to the existence of relative weights  and . 
2) Establishment of Prediction Equations 
The predicted path  held by the driver is derived by 
iterating the driver-vehicle dynamics equation (3). This is 
started by deriving the output vector at time step k + 2, i.e. 
 following the procedure described below: 
             (7) 
By continuing the iteration, the future output vectors from 
 up to  can be derived. Hence, the driver’s 
predicted path  can be expressed as: 
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 , , 
 , ,  
, and 
. 
Equation (8) is called the driver’s prediction equation. 
By following a similar procedure, the automated steering 
system’s prediction equation (9) can be derived as: 
                                    (9) 
where 
 , , 
 , ,  
, and 
. 
It should be noticed that the driver steering angle array  
and automated steering angle  appearing in (8) are both 
of length N1 while in (9) they are both of length N2. 
3) Derivation of Pareto Steering Strategies 
Continuing to follow Rawlings and Mayne [26], the driver’s 
and the automated steering system’s control strategies can be 
derived by minimizing their respective cost functions (5) and 
(6), subject to a ‘global’ prediction equation which combines (8) 
and (9). However, the global prediction equation cannot be 
obtained when the driver’s steering angle array  in (8) 
has a different dimension from that in (9). Towards this end, the 
assumption  is made. As a result, the global 
prediction equation can be obtained as: 
                   (10) 
where 
, , , , 
, and . 
It should be noted that the assumption  is 
reasonable since in many applications, the automated steering 
system was set to have a preview horizon similar to that of a 
human driver, which is typically between 0.5 s to 2 s [24]. 
    Rawlings and Mayne [26] explained that by minimizing the 
driver’s cost function (5) subject to the global prediction 
equation (10), the driver’s optimal steering angle array  
can be developed and expressed in the following form: 
                     (11) 
where  and  are time-invariant gain matrices which are 
functions of , , , , , ,  and . Due to 
space limitation, the intermediate algebraic procedures for 
deriving (11) are omitted. Readers who are interested in the 
derivation are recommended to go to [27] for details. (12) 
implies that the driver’s optimal steering angle array  
that minimizes the driver’s cost function (5) depends linearly 
on the state of the vehicle , the driver’s target path , 
the automated steering system’s target path , but also on 
the automated steering system’s steering angle array . In 
other words, the driver accounts for the automated steering 
system’s steering angle actions during his/her process of 
decision-making. 
The automated steering system’s optimal steering angle array 
 can be solved in a similar way, that is by optimizing its 
cost function (6) subject to the global prediction equation (10): 
                    (12) 
where  and  are time-invariant gain matrices which are 
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6 
At this point, two observations can be made towards the 
expressions of the driver’s optimal steering angle array (11) and 
the automated steering system’s optimal steering angle array 
(12). First, (11) and (12) agree in format with the driver’s and 
the automated system’s conceptual control strategies (1) and 
(2), respectively. Second, (11) and (12) are coupled in such a 
way that the driver’s optimal steering angle array  
depends on the automated steering system’s applied steering 
angle array  and so does . The second 
observation suggests that  and  cannot be solved 
by merely relying on (11) and (12). Towards this end, the 
convex iteration approach [26] is adopted, which involves 
complementing (11) and (12) with two auxiliary equations: 
            (13) 
          (14) 
where p denotes the step of convex iteration, and w1 and w2 are 
iteration weights that satisfy  and . 
Based on equations from (11) to (14), the optimal steering angle 
arrays  and  at any step p can be calculated 
[26]. This paper focuses on a special case where the iteration 
step p reaches infinity, i.e. . In this case,  and 
 will have equilibrium properties [26], that is  
and  will represent respectively the driver’s and the 
automated steering system’s steering angle arrays in a Pareto 
equilibrium sense. Specifically, when , (11) and (12) 
can be rewritten respectively as: 
                  (15) 
                 (16) 
and (13) and (14) becomes: 
               (17) 
            (18) 
Substituting (18) into (15) to eliminate  then yields: 
                  (19) 
Substituting (17) into (16) to eliminate  then yields: 
                 (20) 
Now  and  can be decoupled by substituting 
(19) and (20) into one another. This finally gives: 
                                                             (21) 




and  is an identity matrix of appropriate dimension. 
It should be noted that the array  appearing in (21) 
comprises  elements from  to . Any 
 for  denotes the driver’s optimal 
steering angle value at time step , which is determined at 
current time step k. In reality, the driver at current time step k 
can only apply one particular steering angle value to the vehicle. 
In view of this, the first element in , that is  is 
chosen as the steering angle action that the driver applies. This 
technique conforms to the ‘receding horizon’ idea [28] that is 
well adopted in Model Predictive Control practice. In view of 
this, the following expression holds for : 
                                                    (23) 
where  denotes the first row of . Similarly, the 
automated steering system’s optimal steering angle  
applied at time step k can be obtained as 
                                                    (24) 
where  denotes the first row of . 
(23) and (24) are respectively the driver’s and automated 
steering system’s cooperative Pareto steering strategies. It 
should be noted that both  and  are time-invariant gain 
matrices which are functions of vehicle model parameters , 
,  and , the two controllers’ path-error weighting 
matrices  and , and cost function relative weights  
and . At this point, the question whether a human driver can 
build up his/her cooperative Pareto steering strategy (23) might 
raise since it seems less realistic that a human driver can acquire 
the precise values of , , , , , ,  and . 
Towards this question, the authors think there should not be any 
reason to exclude the possibility that a human driver may 
follow the principle of cooperative game theory to develop their 
steering strategy. However, the driver may not have perfect 
knowledge of , , , , , ,  and . As a 
result, the steering angle that the driver applies to the vehicle in 
practice may differ from that calculated using the driver’s 
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Symbol Quantity Value 
m vehicle mass 1840 kg 
I vehicle yaw moment of inertia 3000 kgm2 
la / lb distance from vehicle centre of 
mass  to front axle / rear axle 
1.136/1.663 m 
Cf / Cr cornering stiffness of front axle / 
rear axle 
116000/187000 N/rad 
G Vehicle overall steering ratio 15.8 
 
cooperative Pareto strategy (23). Such difference may diminish 
as the driver increasingly learns the characteristics of the 
vehicle and the automated steering system via daily driving. It 
is also feasible to use some noise model to represent the driver’s 
imperfect knowledge of , , , , , ,  and , 
such as the ARMA-based noise model proposed in [29]. 
Accordingly, the driver’s steering angle applied to the vehicle 
may be determined by deducting the effect of the noise model 
from the steering angle calculated using the driver’s 
cooperative Pareto strategy (23). Consequently, it would be of 
significance to investigate and understand the influence of the 
parameters involved in (23) and (24) on the driver’s and the 
automated steering system’s steering angles and vehicle 
directional responses. This investigation will be carried out 
through a numerical study in the next subsection. 
C. Numerical Analysis 
In this subsection, the effects of varying four types of 
parameters are studied: i) cost function relative weights  and 
, ii) lateral displacement error weights  and , iii) 
lateral displacement error integral weights  and , and 
iv) preview horizon N. The longitudinal speed of the vehicle is 
fixed at 20 m/s and the simulation time step is fixed at 0.01 s. 
Values of vehicle parameters used in the simulation are 
provided in Table I. 
The driving scenario employed in the simulation involves a 
driver and an automated steering system attempting to follow 
different target paths. Specifically, the driver has a straight-line 
target path while the automated steering system holds a single- 
lane-change target path, as described in Table II. It should be 
noted that such a scenario may be less realistic from a practical 
point of view since in a cooperative situation the driver and the 
automated system are very much likely to have similar targets. 
The main reason for using such a conflicting driving scenario is 
that it is more helpful for comparing the steering angles given 
by the driver and the automated steering system.  
Fig. 2 (a) illustrates the influence of cost function relative 
weights  and . In this study, the preview horizon N is set 
to be 200 steps, i.e. 2.0 s. The driver’s and the automated 
steering system’s path-error weights are set to be , 
 and . The left plot shows the how 
the vehicle’s center of gravity displaces laterally as it travels 
ahead. The driver’s and the automated steering system’s target 
paths are also provided in this subplot. The right plot shows 
how the driver’s and the automated system’s steering angles 
vary as the vehicle travels ahead. Since the longitudinal speed 
of the vehicle is fixed at 20 m/s throughout the simulation, these 
two plots are equivalent respectively to the time histories of the 
vehicle path and the time histories of steering angles. It can be 
seen that when  (solid lines) is set, that is, when 
equal attention is paid to tracking the driver’s and the 
automated steering system’s target paths, the two controllers’ 
steering angle histories are identical. As a result, the vehicle 
travels along a path equally displaced from the driver’s and the 
automated system’s target paths. When  and  
are set (dashed lines), that is, when more attention is paid to 
tracking the driver’s straight-line target path, the amplitudes of 
both controllers’ steering angles decrease in comparison to the 
 case. Reasonably, the vehicle gets closer to the 
driver’s target path. In contrast, when  and  
(dotted lines), the vehicle gets closer to the automated steering 
system’s lane-change target path. 
Fig. 2 (b) displays the influence of lateral displacement error 
weights  and . Here N remains 200 steps, i.e. 2.0 s,  
and  are both set to be 0.5, and the yaw angle error weights 
 and  and the lateral displacement error integral weights 
 and  are all kept 0. The  case which was 
studied in Fig. 2 is then used as the benchmark (solid lines). It 
can be seen when the driver’s  is increased unilaterally to 
0.4 (dashed lines), both controllers’ steering angles decrease 
but remain identical. As a result, the vehicle gets closer to the 
driver’s straight-line target path. When the automated steering 
system’s  is increased unilaterally to 0.8 (dotted lines), the 
two controllers’ steering angles increase, and the vehicle gets 
closer to the automated system’s lane-change target path. 
Fig. 2 (c) exhibits the influence of lateral displacement error 
integral weights  and . In this study, N remains 200 
steps, i.e. 2.0 s,  and  remain 0.5, and the other path-error 
weights are set to be  and . The 
benchmark case involves  (solid lines), which is 
identical to the benchmarks used in Fig. 2 (a) and (b). On this 
basis, when a tiny value of is introduced, that is 
 (dashed lines), both the driver’s and automated 
system’s steering angles reduce compared to the benchmark 
case, and the vehicle converges to the driver’s straight-line 
target path. In order to further examine the effect of penalizing 
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Fig. 2.    Simulated time histories of vehicle lateral displacement (leftward) and driver and automated system steering angles (rightward). Subplot (a) shows the 
influence of cost function relative weights  and , where solid: , dashed: , , and dotted: , . Subplot (b) 
shows the influence of lateral displacement error weights  and , where solid: , dashed: , , and dotted: , . 
Subplot (c) shows the influence of lateral displacement error integral weights  and , where solid: , dashed: ,  and 
dotted: , . Subplot (d) shows the influence of preview horizon , where solid: , dashed: , and dotted: . 
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lateral displacement error integral, the dashed vehicle lateral 
displacement shown in Fig. 2 (c) is compared to that shown in 
Fig. 2 (b). It can be found from Fig. 2 (c) that the introduction of 
 enables the vehicle to eventually get onto the 
driver’s straight-line target path without experiencing 
steady-state path-following error. Whereas in Fig. 2 (b) where 
there is no  employed, even increasing  from 0.1 to 0.4, 
that is, enlarging by four times cannot help with eliminating 
the vehicle’s steady-state path-following error from the driver’s 
straight-line target path. By the same token, the introduction of 
 (dotted lines) causes increase in both the driver’s 
and the automated system’s steering angles, and results in the 
elimination of vehicle path-following error with respect to the 
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Fig. 2 (d) illustrates the influence of preview horizon N. In 
this study,  and  remains 0.5, and the path-error weights 
are set to be , , , and 
. The benchmark case employs steps, i.e. 2.0 
s (solid lines). It can be seen that the vehicle converges to the 
driver’s straight-line target path in this case, mainly due to the 
introduction of . When the preview horizon N is 
reduced to 100 steps, i.e. 1.0 s (dashed lines), the driver’s and 
the automated system’s steering angles increase and the vehicle 
takes longer time to get onto the driver’s target path. In contrast, 
when N is risen to 300 steps, i.e. 3.0 s (dotted lines), the two 
controller’s steering angles decrease and the vehicle converges 
to the driver’s target path more quickly.  
 
IV. CASE STUDY: COMPARISON BETWEEN DRIVER 
NON-COOPERATIVE AND COOPERATIVE STEERING STRATEGIES  
The numerical analysis presented in the previous section 
involves a driving scenario where the driver and the automated 
steering system hold different target paths, and both adopt 
cooperative Pareto steering strategies. Such a driving scenario 
is fine for studying the effect of varying control parameters; 
however, it is less realistic in terms of representing practical 
driving situations. In fact, a human driver is less likely to adopt 
a cooperative steering strategy when he/she holds a different 
goal from the automated steering system in vehicle control. On 
the other hand, the driver would be more liable to cooperate 
with the automated system when he/she has developed a feeling 
that the automated system is attempting to pursue a goal similar 
to his/her own goal. In light of this, a more realistic driving 
scenario is designed in this section, and the impact of a driver’s 
adoption of a cooperative Pareto steering strategy, compared to 
his/her adoption of a non-cooperative Nash steering strategy is 
studied. 
A. Driving Scenario and Target Paths 
The driving scenario employed in this case study is outlined 
in Table III. It is, in general, a path-following scenario where 
both the driver and the automated steering system aim at 
controlling the vehicle to follow their individual target paths. 
The driving scenario can be divided into two stages according 
to what particular target path the human driver follows. During 
the first stage, the driver holds a double-lane-change target path 
while the automated steering system holds a straight-line target 
path. Such a conflict in target paths may arise when the driver 
thinks it would be safe to perform an overtaking maneuver, but 
the automated system has detected some potential risk from the 
driver’s lane change initiative, e.g., an incoming vehicle in the 
opposite lane, and thus started its lane keeping control 
automatically.  As a result, the driver would attempt to steer the 
vehicle to move into the opposite lane while the automated 
steering system would attempt to pull the vehicle back to its 
original lane. Consequently, the driver and the automated 
steering system tend to compete for vehicle directional control. 
The vehicle, subjected to the steering control of both the driver 
and the automated steering system, would possibly displace 
laterally as it travels ahead. Later, the driver may be able to see 
the incoming vehicle in the opposite lane. Accordingly, the 
driver may decide to give up his/her initial attempt at lane 
change but start to apply counter steering so as to get back to 
the original lane. Such a shift in the driver’s goal marks the end 
of the first stage but the start of the second stage. This instant is 
schematically marked using a ‘star’ symbol as shown in Table 
III. The boundary between the two stages is then marked using 
a dash-dot line that passes the star symbol. During the second 
stage, the driver no longer holds the double-lane-change target 
path but sticks to a straight-line target path that is identical to 
the target path of the automated steering system. 
B. Steering Strategies 
The automated steering system concerned in this study uses a 
steering strategy of the non-cooperative Nash form [18]. Such a 
steering strategy partially neutralizes the effect of the driver’s 
steering control so that possible adverse effects due to human 
errors can be mitigated. Automated steering control that 
follows similar design concept has been studied and validated 
in several publications, e.g. [30] and [31].  
The driver is assumed to use a non-cooperative Nash steering 
strategy to interact with the automated steering system during 
the first stage. Derivation of the driver’s non-cooperative Nash 
steering strategy was formulated in detail in [18]. Here a recap 
of the key points of the derivation is provided below. 
1) Driver’s cost function in a non-cooperative game 
In a non-cooperative game, the driver focuses on pursuing 
his/her individual interest, that is to minimize his/her individual 
path-following error . Hence, the driver’s cost function 
can be expressed as: 
              (25) 
By comparing the driver’s non-cooperative cost function (25) 
to the driver’s cooperative cost function (4), it can be found that 
in a non-cooperative game, the driver does not take into account 
the automated system’s path-following interest . This is 
the key difference between a non-cooperative game and a 
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cooperative game. In other words, this reflects the fundamental 
difference between a cooperative driver and a noncooperative 
driver. It should be noted that a cooperative driver does not 
necessarily require their own path-following interest  to 
be in consistent with the automated steering system’s 
path-following interest . In theory in a cooperative case 
 and  can be different or even distinct from each 
other, e.g. the driver attempts to follow a straight-line path 
while the automated steering system attempts to follow a 
lane-change target path, as discussed in the previous section. 
Such a concept of cooperation is consistent with corresponding 
definitions proposed in many other publications, e.g. [32]. 
2) Driver’s prediction equation in a non-cooperative game 
In a non-cooperative game, the driver does not use the global 
prediction equation (10). Instead, the driver uses his/her 
individual prediction equation (8). 
3) Driver’s non-cooperative Nash steering strategy 
By optimizing the driver’s non-cooperative cost function (25) 
subject to the driver’s individual prediction equation (8), the 
driver’s non-cooperative Nash steering strategy can be finally 
obtained, as shown in (26):  
                         (26) 
By comparing the driver’s non-cooperative Nash steering 
strategy (26) to his/her cooperative Pareto steering strategy (23), 
it can be seen that they are similar in format. However, the  
appearing in the non-cooperative Nash steering strategy (26) is 
irrelevant to the cost function relative weights  or . 
During the first stage as depicted in Table III, the assumption 
that the driver uses a non-cooperative Nash steering strategy to 
interact with the automated system is thought reasonable. This 
is mainly due to the situation that the driver choses to follow a 
target path which is completely different from the target path of 
the automated system. Accordingly, the driver may naturally 
move to the Nash equilibrium at which the driver’s interest in 
terms of tracking the double-lane-change target path can be 
maximized. On the other hand, it would be difficult to imagine 
that the driver could develop a cooperative Pareto strategy over 
this stage, which requires the driver to consider the interest of 
the automated system in terms of its path-following control.  
Later when the driver enters the second stage, that is, when 
the driver decides to give up his/her lane change aspiration but 
start to follow a straight-line target path, the probability that the 
driver develops a cooperative Pareto steering strategy may rise. 
This is primarily because during the second stage the driver 
intends to track a straight-line target path which is identical to 
that of the automated system. The alignment of the driver’s 
target path with that of the automated system may affect the 
driver to account for the automated system’s path-following 
control. Alternatively, the driver may continue using the 
non-cooperative Nash strategy that he/she has been using 
through the first stage.  
In a nutshell, the driver’s possible steering behavior during 
the two stages may be summarized as: 
1) During the first stage, the driver has a double-lane-change 
target path. During this stage, the assumption that the 
driver uses a non-cooperative Nash steering strategy is 
reasonable; whereas the assumption that the driver uses a 
cooperative Pareto steering strategy is less reasonable. 
2) During the second stage, the driver has a straight-line 
target path. During this stage, either the assumption that 
the driver continues to adopt a non-cooperative Nash 
steering strategy or that the driver develops a cooperative 
Pareto steering strategy could be rational. 
It is noteworthy here that during the second stage the 
proposition that the driver holds a straight-line target path 
identical to the automated steering system’s target path does not 
conflict with the authors’ assumption that the driver adopts a 
non-cooperative Nash strategy. In other words, the driver in 
theory can still use a non-cooperative steering strategy to 
interact with the automated system even when the two 
controllers have identical target path. This is supported by the 
fact that a non-cooperative game does not necessarily require 
the game players to have conflicting interest but mainly 
requires them to focus pursuing their interest individually [10]. 
By transferring such requirements into the case discussed 
above, the driver’s adoption of a non-cooperative steering 
strategy suggests that the driver focuses on pursuing the 
driver’s individual interest in term of path tracking without 
considering the automated steering system’s interest. The 
driver’s adoption of a non-cooperative steering strategy is 
irrelevant to whether the driver’s and the automated steering 
system’s path-tracking interest are identical or distinct. 
C. Simulation Results 
Based on the formulation made above, a comparative study 
is carried out aiming at inspecting the impact of different driver 
steering strategies on the driver’s and the automated system’s 
steering angles and vehicle directional responses. The switch 
from the first stage to the second stage is set to be triggered 
when the vehicle reaches a lateral displacement of 1.0 m, 
resulting from the steering interaction between the driver and 
the automated system during the first stage. Such a 
lateral-displacement-based trigger is practical since the driver’s 
view of the opposite lane will become clearer as the vehicle 
moves more in the lateral direction. Accordingly, the driver at 
some point may be able to see the incoming vehicle in the 
opposite lane. When this happens, the driver will give up 
his/her attempt at lane change but steer the vehicle back to the 
original lane. The simulation time step, vehicle longitudinal 
speed and vehicle parameters are kept identical to those 
employed in Section III. The preview horizon N is set to be 100 
steps, i.e. 1.0 s. On this basis, simulation results obtained from 
the driver adopting a cooperative Pareto steering strategy 
during the second stage are compared to those obtained from 
the driver using a non-cooperative Nash steering strategy 
during the second stage. Specifically, the comparison is made 
under three sets of control parameters:  
1( )kE
2 ( )kE
































Fig. 3.    Simulated time histories of vehicle lateral displacement (leftward) and driver and automated system steering angles (rightward). Subplot (a) shows the 
results from parameter Set A, where solid: driver using non-cooperative Nash strategy during the second stage, dotted: driver using cooperative Pareto strategy 
during the second stage. Subplot (b) shows the results from parameter Set B, where solid: driver using non-cooperative Nash strategy during the second stage, 
dotted: driver using cooperative Pareto strategy during the second stage. Subplot (c) shows the results from parameter Set C, where solid: driver using 
non-cooperative Nash strategy during the second stage, dotted: driver using cooperative Pareto strategy during the second stage. 



















































































































































Set A: , , and , 
Set B: , , and ,     
Set C: , , , and . 
All the rest path-error weights of the driver and of the 
automated steering system are kept 0. 
Fig. 3 (a) illustrates the simulation results from parameter Set 
A. The boundary between the two stages is marked using a 
dash-dot line vertical to the horizontal axis in this figure. 
During the first stage, that is, at the left-hand-side of the 
dash-dot boundary line, both the driver and the automated 
steering system adopt non-cooperative Nash steering strategies. 
The driver is set to pursue the double-lane-change target path 
while the automated system is set to follow the straight-line 
target path. It can be seen that the driver and the automated 
system steer in opposite directions, and the vehicle starts to 
deviate from its original lane. When the vehicle reaches a 
lateral displacement of 1.0 m, the driver is assumed to realize 
the risk of his/her lane change maneuver and thus changes 
his/her target path from double-lane-change to straight-line. 
This change in the driver’s target path marks the start of the 
second stage. As it was explained previously, during the second 
stage, the driver may adopt either a non-cooperative Nash or a 
cooperative Pareto steering strategy to interact with the 
automated steering system. Results from the driver adopting the 
non-cooperative strategy during this stage are presented in solid 
lines while those from the driver adopting the cooperative 
Pareto strategy are shown in dotted lines for comparison. It can 
be seen that compared to the case where the driver adopts a 
non-cooperative Nash strategy, the case where the driver uses a 
cooperative Pareto strategy involves larger driver steering 
angles towards moving back to the vehicle’s original lane. 
Specifically, the driver’s steering angle is 49.3 deg when it 
reached the first peak under the non-cooperative Nash strategy. 
This steering angle is shown in Fig. 3 (a) as a negative value, 
1 2 0.5r r= = 1 0.6
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which indicates the driver steering towards direction of the 
original lane. In contrast, the driver’s first peak steering angle 
under the cooperative Pareto strategy is 66.7 deg (shown in Fig. 
3 (a) as a negative value). Accordingly, the vehicle controlled 
under the driver’s adoption of a cooperative Pareto steering 
strategy first reached the straight-line target path at a 
longitudinal displacement of 222.4 m, compared to that of 
226.4 m under the driver’s adoption of non-cooperative Nash 
steering strategy. Such a 4-meter difference in longitudinal 
direction suggests that the driver’s adoption of a cooperative 
Pareto strategy enables the vehicle to return to the straight-line 
target path 0.2 s swifter than the driver’s adoption of a non- 
cooperative Nash strategy. Soon after, the driver’s and the 
automated steering system’s steering angles converge to zero, 
and the vehicle travels straight ahead in its original lane. The 
differences between the steering angle time histories of the 
driver’s cooperative Pareto and his/her non-cooperative Nash 
stem from the differences in the prediction equations and cost 
functions used for deriving the two steering strategies. 
Fig. 3 (b) exhibits the simulation results from parameter Set 
B, where the driver’s lateral displacement error weight  is 
significantly reduced compared to that in Set A. It can be seen 
from this figure that the characteristics of the interaction 
between the driver and automated steering system are generally 
similar to those shown in Fig. 3 (a): the driver and the 
automated system steers counter to each other during the first 
stage while their steering angles converge to zero in the second 
stage. However, there exist one key difference between the 
results shown in Fig. 3 (b) and Fig. 3 (a): since the driver’s 
weight  is reduced, the driver would have less capacity to 
steer the vehicle to follow his/her double-lane-change target 
path during the first stage. Due to this fact, the amplitudes of the 
driver’s and the automated system’s steering angles exhibited 
in the first stage, i.e. at the left side of the dash-dot boundary are 
obviously lower than those shown in Fig. 3 (a). Specifically, 
under parameter Set B, the driver’s peak steering angle during 
the first stage is 41.0 deg while under parameter Set A, the 
corresponding value reaches 74.9 deg. Accordingly, in fig. 3(b) 
the vehicle reaches the 1.0 m lateral displacement later than in 
Fig. 3 (a). Besides this key difference, it is also noteworthy that 
in both Fig. 3 (a) and (b), that is, under both parameter Sets A 
and B, the driver’s adoption of a cooperative Pareto steering 
strategy in the second stage (as shown in dashed lines) brings 
about larger driver steering angles compared to the driver’s 
adoption of a non-cooperative Nash strategy. This enables the 
vehicle to move back to straight-line driving more quickly. 
Fig. 3 (c) displays the simulation results from parameter Set 
C, where unbalanced cost function weights  and 
 are employed. Such setting suggests that when the 
driver uses the cooperative Pareto steering strategy, the driver 
accounts more for the automated steering system’s control 
behavior. In other words, the driver with such cost function 
weights tends to be more cooperative from the automated 
steering system’s point of view. It can be seen that compared to 
parameter Set A (Fig. 3 (a)) where balanced cost function 
weights are used, the driver in this unbalanced situation tends to 
steer more intensively when he/she adopts a cooperative Pareto 
strategy during the second stage (see dashed lines in the 
rightward subplot in Fig. 3 (c)). Specifically, the driver’s 
steering angle reaches 89.4 deg at its first peak (shown in Fig. 3 
(c) as a negative value), compared to the corresponding 66.7 
deg obtained under parameter Set A (Fig. 3 (a)). This in turn 
enables the vehicle to return to its original lane at a longitudinal 
displacement of 218.6 m, which is more quickly compared to 
the 222.4 m observed under parameter Set A. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper concerned modelling a human driver’s interaction 
with an automated driving system using cooperative game 
theory. The interaction problem was discussed in the context of 
a driver controlling a vehicle equipped with an automated 
steering system, where the driver and the automated system had 
individual target paths, and were able to apply steering angles 
to the vehicle independently. The distributed Model Predictive 
Control approach was adopted to analytically derive the 
driver’s and the automated steering system’s steering strategies 
in a Pareto equilibrium sense, namely their cooperative Pareto 
steering strategies. 
 Numerical analysis was performed to examine the influence 
of key parameters in Pareto steering strategies on the driver’s 
and the automated steering system’s steering angles and vehicle 
lateral response. It was found that when the driver is interacting 
with an automated steering system that held a different target 
path, the driver could improve his/her path-following capability 
by means of i) increasing his/her penalization on vehicle lateral 
deviation, ii) enlarging his/her preview horizon, and iii) putting 
more emphasis on pursuing his/her own interest in the driver’s 
cooperative cost function.  
A comparative case study was then carried out to inspect the 
difference between the driver’s adoption of a non-cooperative 
Nash steering strategy and the driver’s use of a cooperative 
Pareto steering strategy in the same driving scenario. It was 
found that the driver’s adoption of a cooperative Pareto steering 
strategy lead to different steering angle histories and vehicle 
lateral motions from those resulted from the driver’s adoption 
of a non-cooperative Nash steering strategy. Specifically, the 
driver’s adoption of Pareto strategy resulted in a reinforcement 
of the driver’s steering angle control, which in turn enabled the 
vehicle to return from a risky lane-change maneuver back to a 
safer straight-line travelling quickly. 
In future work, experiments using a driving simulator will be 
conducted to measure human driver steering behavior from a 
large number of test drivers with different driving experience. 
The cooperative Pareto steering strategy proposed in this paper 
will be fit to all measured driver steering behavior for 
validation. Key driver control parameters involved in the 
cooperative Pareto steering strategy will be identified through a 
proper system identification approach. The identified driver 
control parameters can then be built into automated steering 
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drivers’ real-life steering control behavior and to achieve more 
effective shared control between driver and automation. 
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